Colombo, Sri Lanka — Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa was expected to utilize the ruling party's special convention on Nov. 15 to announce the dates for upcoming general elections as well as the presidential election. There was speculation as to whether he would declare the presidential election prior to or after the general election, or whether both would be held concurrently.
The president, however, made no categorical statement as to which election would take place first, although there was a hint that it would be the general election. Taking a statesmanlike approach, he said that he would not alter the election schedule like other political leaders had tried to do in the past.
It was widely held that as the president is more popular than the rest of his government he would confidently go in first and notch up a big victory. He would then lead his team to another resounding victory at the general elections and possibly even obtain a two-thirds majority that would enable constitutional change to his government's advantage.
As Parliament ends its six-year term in April 2010, and the next presidential election is not due until November 2011, it seems fairly certain that general elections would come first. On the other hand, there was always an element of doubt about the holding of a presidential election in the immediate future. This was due to the shortening of the president's first term of office by two years.
However, the circumstances under which Rajapaksa has put off announcing an early presidential election creates an impression that it is not simply the loss of two years that deterred him from calling a presidential poll early. The predicament most likely to have determined Rajapaksa's decision not to face an election at this time was scarcely foreseen a month ago, when he seemed to be riding the crest of a wave that many believed would last for years, if not decades.
The decisive factor behind the change in the government's calculations is perhaps the sudden emergence of former Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka as a potential challenger for the presidency.
As long as Fonseka was seen as a part of the government team that won the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, it was reasonable for the government as a whole, and the president in particular, to take credit for the victory. But with the breakdown in relations between Fonseka and the government leadership, it no longer seems reasonable for the president to take exclusive credit for the victory.
Once a negative cycle begins, it is difficult to stop it from gathering momentum. Other vulnerabilities in the government's position have suddenly begun to emerge. One is the action taken by trade unions affiliated to the opposition.
During the war years, the trade union movement was notably dormant. People of all strata, including the working classes, understood the enormous economic and social costs associated with combating the LTTE and decided to bear with it in the best interests of eliminating the LTTE for good. However, six months after the war's end, people find their patience running low. In addition, there is resentment at the increasing corruption and nepotism within the government.
Although Fonseka has not publicly declared his intention to enter politics, the mere possibility appears to have rejuvenated the opposition and boosted their morale. A strong opposition is an essential ingredient of any functioning democracy. It is a well-known axiom in politics, and in all aspects of life, that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
During the last three years of war, and even after it ended, it appeared that the power and centralization of the government was growing without adequate checks and balances to keep the political system healthy and vibrant.
Ironically, one of the major beneficiaries of Fonseka's entry into politics could be the ethnic minority. With the general who led the army to victory over the LTTE now on the side of the opposition, the government cannot rely any more on its own advocacy of Sinhalese nationalist positions to win the majority of the Sinhalese electorate.
In previous elections, the government was able to win by simply appealing to the Sinhalese majority to disregard and alienate the ethnic minorities. Fonseka, as one of the opposition leaders, is bound to divide the Sinhalese nationalist vote. As a result, in order to win, the ethnic minority vote will become important for both the government and the opposition.
In recent days the government has been responding with more alacrity to the concerns of the Tamil people with regard to issues of resettlement and freedom of movement. Quite suddenly, after more than six months of insisting that the Tamil population displaced from former LTTE-held areas need to be confined in government welfare camps, the government has started releasing thousands of them. More than half of the displaced population is now out of welfare camps.
In addition, the government has lifted many restrictions on the movement of traffic on the A9 highway that connects the northern capital of Jaffna to the country’s south and which runs through former LTTE-held areas.
Even Fonseka, who during the war period spoke of Sri Lanka as a Sinhalese country in which minorities had to know their place and not make undue demands, appears to have moderated his position. He has also been requested by the opposition alliance to reach an understanding with the major Tamil political party. It appears that the clash of the Sinhalese titans can pave the way for the politics of moderation.
Prospective governments will have to seek the support of all ethnic communities and be mindful of their grievances and aspirations, rather than relying solely on mobilizing the nationalism of the ethnic majority.
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