REFUGEE

NEW YORK - Defying the onslaught of pessimistic predictions, the Geneva meeting on Thursday of Iran and the "Iran Six" nations did not end in failure, given the recent revelations of a second Iranian uranium-enrichment plant.

Rather, there was a mini-breakthrough in that both Iran on the one side and the United States, Britain, China, France, Russia and Germany on the other agreed to hold a follow-up meeting later this month. What is more, US and Iranian representatives met one-on-one on the sidelines of the meeting, following an 11th-hour request by the US on Wednesday.

Adding to the flurry of diplomatic initiatives surrounding the Geneva talks was a surprise move by the US Department of State to grant a visa to Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki visit Washington, ostensibly to inspect Iran's Interest Section. However, this unprecedented visit might have been mainly symbolic as a gesture of goodwill by the Barack Obama administration on the eve of the Geneva meeting.

Reciprocating the warm signals from Washington, Mottaki in an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations reiterated Iran's readiness for comprehensive and constructive dialogue, while making it clear that Tehran's intention at the Geneva talks was to defend the country's nuclear rights.

"Our intention is also to see if there is a change of behavior on the part of the Obama administration and if we can detect evidence of a new behavior away from the hegemonic mindset and toward mutual respect," Mottaki said, adding that the threat of sanctions could "ruin opportunities for cooperation".

Mottaki's presence in the US has been a major plus for US-Iran diplomacy, by allowing Iran to complement its moves at the negotiation table in Geneva with Mottaki's string of interviews to the US media, meant to bolster Iran's public diplomacy.

Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, added some meaningful bone to Iran's negotiation posture by holding a press conference one day ahead of the Geneva talks. He expressed optimism about the meeting and proposed the establishment of "three specialized committees" that would issue reports on pertinent nuclear and non-nuclear issues of mutual concern, culminating in a "summit of heads of states".

Also, Ahmadinejad made sure that such gestures by Iran would be understood as a part of his government's efforts to shore up Iran's role in "global management". In other words, as aspects of a coherent global strategy that seeks to assert a trans-regional and indeed global status for Iran in light of Iran's geostrategic and geoeconomic importance.

The details of the Geneva talks had not been made public at time of writing. Ahead of the meeting, a statement by a US State Department spokesperson referred optimistically to the talk's prospects of leading to "more in-depth dialogue". He also assured the world that the US would refrain from "snap judgments".

Although on the latter, the US's negotiator, William Burns, a George W Bush appointee who is ranked as under secretary of state for political affairs, seemed to harbor minor misgivings about the ability of Iran's negotiation team led by Saeed Jalili to "make decisions", per an interview with a former US official who spoke to the author on condition of anonymity.

Tehran's decision to agree to the US's request for a one-on-one meeting, specifically tailored to discuss Iran's nuclear program, may come as a shock to the hawkish critics of Obama's Iran policy. They have painted the Iranian government as rigid and inflexible.

That is not Iran's own self-understanding. As a case in point, at a private meeting with US think-tanks in New York last week, Ahmadinejad repeatedly emphasized his record of showing flexibility toward the Obama administration, without, however, receiving any reply from Obama.

Instead, Obama has directed all his communication to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, bypassing Ahmadinejad. This is partly due to the poor advice he has received from a number of "Iran experts", such as Vali Nasr and Ray Takyeh, who have publicly dismissed Ahmadinejad as a "noisemaker" without any significant power and influence in decision-making.

Yet, Iran's presidency is a powerful institution and Ahmadinejad is a source of foreign policy decision-making, even though the supreme leader's final seal of approval is mandatory for the macro-policies. Both in terms of devising specific tactics and strategies and selecting foreign and nuclear priorities, without doubt Ahmadinejad and his foreign policy team, including Jalili and Mottaki, play a central role.

The October surprise in US-Iran relations now consists of the fact that despite numerous hurdles, a semi-successful initial direct encounter between the US and Iran has transpired. This could conceivably be deepened in subsequent meetings, which will in turn further build confidence, especially against the backdrop of a rather poisoned environment filled with accusations and counter-accusations.

One reason why the Geneva meeting did not collapse is that there is a zone of agreement between the two sides when it comes to the thorny issue of Iran's nuclear transparency. This follows repeated assurances by Ali Akbar Salehi, the new head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, regarding a timetable for inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of Iran's self-disclosed second enrichment facility under construction near the city of Qom.

Iran's disclosure of that site, in a letter to the IAEA on September 21, together with Iran's test-firing of short-, medium- and long-range missiles on the eve of the Geneva talks, were meant to solidify Iran's bargaining position. The idea was to introduce new hurdles to the "military option" by showcasing Iran's deterrent capability. The moves were also to show that Iran's nuclear program could survive an attack, given Iran's nuclear know-how.

These efforts by Iran pretty much neutralized the West's pre-meeting maneuvers to weaken Tehran's position, including Obama's decision to scrap a US missile defense shield in Europe on the grounds that Iran did not pose a long-range missile threat for the foreseeable future. Yet, within days of that announcement, Iran was able to successfully test-fire the Shahab-3 and (solid fuel) Sejil missiles that are capable of hitting parts of Israel, Europe, as well as US bases in the region.

"In Iran today, many people are congratulating the government for its successful heavy lifting of some chess pieces, without which the P5+1 [Iran Six] would be eating Iran alive in Geneva," a Tehran University political science professor told the author.

Indeed, there is a consensus among Tehran's foreign policy experts that through deft hard-power and soft-power diplomacy, Iran has gained much respect in the international community and forced the other side to treat it with greater deference.

The issue of Iran's nuclear program - which many still believe is aimed at developing nuclear weapons - is far from settled, though. It will require willpower on both sides of the negotiation table to move forward, by focusing on areas of shared interests and "objective guarantees" to ensure Iran's peaceful nuclear program, to echo Javier Solana, the European Union's foreign policy chief.

Already, in light of the IAEA's regular inspections of Iran's facilities and its cameras and other surveillance measures at the enrichment facility at Natanz, a good deal of those objective guarantees are firmly in place. What is needed is to extend those to Iran's new facility, and, perhaps to convince Iran to re-adopt the intrusive Additional Protocol of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The latter is possible if the United Nations Security Council agrees to drop its demand for Iran to suspend its uranium-enrichment program, a demand that is rejected by Iran as "unlawful" and which has absolutely no chance of being embraced by any politician in Tehran, short of political suicide.

At this point, with the glass of US-Iran diplomacy now half full after an initial encounter that has opened the possibilities for future dialogue, there is sufficient ground for cautious optimism of a de-escalation of Iran's nuclear crisis.
visit Washington, ostensibly to inspect Iran's Interest Section. However, this unprecedented visit might have been mainly symbolic as a gesture of goodwill by the Barack Obama administration on the eve of the Geneva meeting.

Reciprocating the warm signals from Washington, Mottaki in an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations reiterated Iran's readiness for comprehensive and constructive dialogue, while making it clear that Tehran's intention at the Geneva talks was to defend the country's nuclear rights.

"Our intention is also to see if there is a change of behavior on the part of the Obama administration and if we can detect evidence of a new behavior away from the hegemonic mindset and toward mutual respect," Mottaki said, adding that the threat of sanctions could "ruin opportunities for cooperation".

Mottaki's presence in the US has been a major plus for US-Iran diplomacy, by allowing Iran to complement its moves at the negotiation table in Geneva with Mottaki's string of interviews to the US media, meant to bolster Iran's public diplomacy.

Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, added some meaningful bone to Iran's negotiation posture by holding a press conference one day ahead of the Geneva talks. He expressed optimism about the meeting and proposed the establishment of "three specialized committees" that would issue reports on pertinent nuclear and non-nuclear issues of mutual concern, culminating in a "summit of heads of states".

Also, Ahmadinejad made sure that such gestures by Iran would be understood as a part of his government's efforts to shore up Iran's role in "global management". In other words, as aspects of a coherent global strategy that seeks to assert a trans-regional and indeed global status for Iran in light of Iran's geostrategic and geoeconomic importance.

The details of the Geneva talks had not been made public at time of writing. Ahead of the meeting, a statement by a US State Department spokesperson referred optimistically to the talk's prospects of leading to "more in-depth dialogue". He also assured the world that the US would refrain from "snap judgments".

Although on the latter, the US's negotiator, William Burns, a George W Bush appointee who is ranked as under secretary of state for political affairs, seemed to harbor minor misgivings about the ability of Iran's negotiation team led by Saeed Jalili to "make decisions", per an interview with a former US official who spoke to the author on condition of anonymity.

Tehran's decision to agree to the US's request for a one-on-one meeting, specifically tailored to discuss Iran's nuclear program, may come as a shock to the hawkish critics of Obama's Iran policy. They have painted the Iranian government as rigid and inflexible.

That is not Iran's own self-understanding. As a case in point, at a private meeting with US think-tanks in New York last week, Ahmadinejad repeatedly emphasized his record of showing flexibility toward the Obama administration, without, however, receiving any reply from Obama.

Instead, Obama has directed all his communication to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, bypassing Ahmadinejad. This is partly due to the poor advice he has received from a number of "Iran experts", such as Vali Nasr and Ray Takyeh, who have publicly dismissed Ahmadinejad as a "noisemaker" without any significant power and influence in decision-making.

Yet, Iran's presidency is a powerful institution and Ahmadinejad is a source of foreign policy decision-making, even though the supreme leader's final seal of approval is mandatory for the macro-policies. Both in terms of devising specific tactics and strategies and selecting foreign and nuclear priorities, without doubt Ahmadinejad and his foreign policy team, including Jalili and Mottaki, play a central role.

The October surprise in US-Iran relations now consists of the fact that despite numerous hurdles, a semi-successful initial direct encounter between the US and Iran has transpired. This could conceivably be deepened in subsequent meetings, which will in turn further build confidence, especially against the backdrop of a rather poisoned environment filled with accusations and counter-accusations.

One reason why the Geneva meeting did not collapse is that there is a zone of agreement between the two sides when it comes to the thorny issue of Iran's nuclear transparency. This follows repeated assurances by Ali Akbar Salehi, the new head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, regarding a timetable for inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of Iran's self-disclosed second enrichment facility under construction near the city of Qom.

Iran's disclosure of that site, in a letter to the IAEA on September 21, together with Iran's test-firing of short-, medium- and long-range missiles on the eve of the Geneva talks, were meant to solidify Iran's bargaining position. The idea was to introduce new hurdles to the "military option" by showcasing Iran's deterrent capability. The moves were also to show that Iran's nuclear program could survive an attack, given Iran's nuclear know-how.

These efforts by Iran pretty much neutralized the West's pre-meeting maneuvers to weaken Tehran's position, including Obama's decision to scrap a US missile defense shield in Europe on the grounds that Iran did not pose a long-range missile threat for the foreseeable future. Yet, within days of that announcement, Iran was able to successfully test-fire the Shahab-3 and (solid fuel) Sejil missiles that are capable of hitting parts of Israel, Europe, as well as US bases in the region.

"In Iran today, many people are congratulating the government for its successful heavy lifting of some chess pieces, without which the P5+1 [Iran Six] would be eating Iran alive in Geneva," a Tehran University political science professor told the author.

Indeed, there is a consensus among Tehran's foreign policy experts that through deft hard-power and soft-power diplomacy, Iran has gained much respect in the international community and forced the other side to treat it with greater deference.

The issue of Iran's nuclear program - which many still believe is aimed at developing nuclear weapons - is far from settled, though. It will require willpower on both sides of the negotiation table to move forward, by focusing on areas of shared interests and "objective guarantees" to ensure Iran's peaceful nuclear program, to echo Javier Solana, the European Union's foreign policy chief.

Already, in light of the IAEA's regular inspections of Iran's facilities and its cameras and other surveillance measures at the enrichment facility at Natanz, a good deal of those objective guarantees are firmly in place. What is needed is to extend those to Iran's new facility, and, perhaps to convince Iran to re-adopt the intrusive Additional Protocol of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The latter is possible if the United Nations Security Council agrees to drop its demand for Iran to suspend its uranium-enrichment program, a demand that is rejected by Iran as "unlawful" and which has absolutely no chance of being embraced by any politician in Tehran, short of political suicide.

At this point, with the glass of US-Iran diplomacy now half full after an initial encounter that has opened the possibilities for future dialogue, there is sufficient ground for cautious optimism of a de-escalation of Iran's nuclear crisis.